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SPECIAL EDUCATION IN ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES:  
A RIGHT NOT A PRIVILEGE 
Melissa Edelson* 
 
          A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential 
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the 
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of 
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.1 
– California Constitution art. IX §1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although public education is not a constitutional right 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,2 it is a “uniquely fundamental 
personal interest in California.”3 Before 1975, however, children 
with disabilities were often denied a public education due to a lack of 
resources, understanding, or services.4 With the passage of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) in 1975, those 
individuals are now assured access to a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services 
(“special education”).5 Yet despite constitutional and statutory 
mandates, a nationwide class of individuals is being denied 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. History, 2014, 
George Washington University. I would like to thank Professor Michael Smith for suggesting this 
topic and for providing invaluable advice and guidance throughout the writing process. I would 
also like to thank The Youth Justice Education Clinic at Loyola Law School for its work 
educating law students on how to effectively advocate for youths’ rights in educational settings.  
 1. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 2. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Cal. 1992). 
 3. Id. at 1249. 
 4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2004) (detailing the situation before the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act was enacted). 
 5. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1487 (2004). 
Related services includes “such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services . . . as 
may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.” Related 
services may include, among other things, transportation, speech-language therapy, and 
psychological therapy. Id. § 1401(26). 
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meaningful access to the education to which it is entitled.6 
The IDEA legally entitles youth7 incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities who meet certain prerequisites to special 
education.8 Specifically, they must either (a) have been previously 
identified as having a disability, (b) have received special education 
in the past, or (c) have an individualized education program (“IEP”) 
in place.9 This legal right may be terminated only when the 
individual has either received a high school diploma or reached the 
age of twenty-two.10 
Yet, despite a federal mandate providing special education to 
individuals who meet statutory requirements, adult correctional 
facilities are skirting their responsibility to provide appropriate 
special education to qualified inmates.11 For example, in 2011 it was 
estimated that approximately 61,000 individuals under age twenty-
one were incarcerated on any given day in the United States.12 Other 
estimates indicate that this number is much higher.13 Nonetheless, 
 
 6. Liz Ryan, Youth in the Adult Criminal Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., 10 
(Oct. 2012), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/policybriefs/policyreform/FR_YAC 
JS_2012.pdf. (“Youth have limited access to education while in adult jails and prisons. According 
to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) . . . only 11% of adult jails 
provide special education services.”). 
 7. For clarity, the terms “youth” and “juvenile” are used throughout this Note to describe 
legal minors as well as those individuals below the age of twenty-two who are eligible to receive 
special education under the IDEA. 
 8. Melody Musgrove & Michael K. Yudin, “Dear Colleague” Letter on the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act for Students with Disabilities in Correctional Facilities, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. 1 (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/ 
guid/correctional-education/idea-letter.pdf. 
 9. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(2)(ii) (2008); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(2) (2004). 
 10. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102. Individuals are entitled to receive special education until they reach 
the age of twenty-two, unless they become twenty-two years of age while participating in an 
educational program. In that case, the individual may continue his or her participation in the 
program for the remainder of the current fiscal year. Thus, some statutes state the eligibility cut 
off as twenty-one and others specify the cut off age as twenty-two. See CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 56026(c)(4) (West 2003); Patricia J. Guard, Letter to State Directors of Special Education on 
Implementing the Funding Formula Under the IDEA, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 9, 2005), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2005-1/osep0507funds1q2005.pdf. 
 11. See James J. Stephan, Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2005, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 5 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=530. 
 12. Lois M. Davis et al., How Effective Is Correctional Education, and Where Do We Go 
from Here?, RAND CORP. 21 (2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_ 
reports/RR500/RR564/RAND_RR564.pdf. Estimates of the number of individuals incarcerated in 
adult correctional facilities that are entitled to special education under the IDEA vary from source 
to source. There is very little research or statistics on this population. 
 13. Jason Ziedenberg, You’re an Adult Now: Youth in Adult Criminal Justice Systems, 
NAT’L INST. OF CORRS. 2 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/025555.pdf. (“It has been 
estimated that nearly 250,000 youth under age  18  end  up  in  the  adult  criminal  justice  system 
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the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that out of 1,821 adult 
correctional facilities under state and federal authority, only 667 of 
them provided special education services.14 Reoccurring issues with 
overcrowding, frequent movement of individuals, a lack of qualified 
teachers, and an inability to obtain student records in a timely 
manner, compound this problem.15 As such, while youth are required 
to receive special education services wherever they are incarcerated, 
there is no information on the quality of such services.16 With less 
than forty percent of adult correctional facilities having special 
education programs in place, it is likely that many youth incarcerated 
in such facilities are not receiving the services to which they are 
entitled.17 
Several key IDEA provisions make this avoidance possible.18 In 
particular, four primary provisions exempt adult correctional 
facilities from providing a free appropriate public education to 
school-aged youth in their facilities.19 The first situation occurs when 
providing such services would be inconsistent with state law or 
practice.20 The second situation occurs when the individual in 
question was not previously identified as a child with a disability 
before placement in the adult correctional facility.21 Third, the 
child’s IEP team may modify the child’s IEP or placement if the 
 
 
every year.”). 
 14. Stephan, supra note 11. 
 15. Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, 
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. 25 (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlace 
ForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf. 
 16. Ziedenberg, supra note 13, at 6. 
 17. Stephan, supra note 11. 
 18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004) (allowing states to limit the provision of special 
education if it would be inconsistent with state law or practice); id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
(exempting adult correctional facilities from the child find obligation in limited circumstances), 
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012) (allowing modifications of an incarcerated individual’s IEP in 
certain circumstances), id. § 1416(h) (limiting the withholding power of the Secretary of 
Education in the context of adult penal institutions). 
 19. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004); id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) 
(2012); id. § 1416(h). 
 20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004) (“The obligation to make a free appropriate public 
education available to all children with disabilities does not apply with respect to children . . . 18 
through 21 in a State to the extent that its application to those children would be inconsistent with 
State law or practice.”). 
 21. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (The obligation to provide special education does not apply to 
children “aged 18 through 21 . . . who, in the educational placement prior to their incarceration in 
an adult correctional facility [] were not actually identified as being a child with a disability . . . or 
[] did not have an individualized education program.”). 
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State demonstrates “a bona fide security or compelling penological 
interest that cannot otherwise be accommodated.”22 Lastly, and 
perhaps most damaging, the federal government is statutorily limited 
in what penalties it may enact for IDEA noncompliance in the adult 
correctional facility context.23 
While the above exceptions are legally permissible under the 
IDEA, many adult correctional facilities stretch these provisions 
beyond their intended scope and capacity by denying the provision of 
special education altogether to youth within their institutions.24 
Indeed, researchers have found that “[e]ducational programming 
available for school-age youth incarcerated in adult penal institutions 
is currently woefully inadequate.”25 Not only is this denial 
inconsistent with the IDEA’s overall purpose and California’s 
constitutional interpretation of public education as a fundamental 
right, but it also disregards the advantages that can be obtained 
through educating at-risk youth incarcerated in adult correctional 
facilities.26 
Part II of this Note examines the constitutional and statutory 
provisions that should, in theory, allow all youth incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities access to special education. Part III explores 
the mechanisms that adult correctional facilities use to avoid 
providing special education to youth within their institutions. Part IV 
explains how legal minors end up in the adult criminal justice system 
and the negative educational outcomes associated with youth in adult 
 
 22. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012) (“If a child with a disability is convicted as an adult 
under State law and incarcerated in an adult prison, the child’s IEP Team may modify the child’s 
IEP or placement . . . if the State has demonstrated a bona fide security or compelling penological 
interest that cannot otherwise be accommodated.”). 
 23. Id. § 1416(h). For IDEA violations that occur in adult jails and prisons, the federal 
government may only withhold funding from the agency responsible for providing special 
education in an amount proportionate to the number of eligible students in the adult correctional 
facilities for which the agency is responsible. 
 24. As of 2000, only 40% of state prisons, 60% of federal prisons, 22% of privately funded 
prisons, and 11% of local jails provided special education programs in their facilities. Caroline 
WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EDUCATION AND 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 4 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf; Stephan, 
supra note 11. 
 25. Christine D. Ely, Note, A Criminal Education: Arguing for Adequacy in Adult 
Correctional Facilities, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 795, 796 (2008). 
 26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2004) (discussing the overall purpose of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act); see also Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Cal. 1992) (“[F]or 
California purposes, education remains a fundamental interest which [lies] at the core of our free 
and representative form of government.”). 
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correctional facilities. Part V discusses potential solutions for the 
lack of special education programs in adult correctional facilities. 
Most importantly, the IDEA must be amended in order to close the 
loopholes that adult penal institutions use to limit the provision of 
special education in their institutions.27 
II.  THE RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION IN EXISTING LAW 
There is a divide in California between the right to public 
education created by the California Constitution and state statutes, 
and the actual enforcement of those laws in adult correctional 
facilities. Under the California Constitution—and cases interpreting 
it—education is a fundamental right. Moreover, the IDEA affirms 
that youth are entitled to special education. However, California 
courts have not yet affirmatively considered the constitutional right 
to special education for individuals incarcerated in adult prisons. In 
contrast, the Washington Supreme Court has decided that 
incarcerated individuals above the age of eighteen are not entitled to 
protections under the IDEA.28 It is unclear whether the California 
Supreme Court will follow Washington’s precedent. Nevertheless, a 
general examination of California law, and of the IDEA in its 
entirety, demonstrates the divide between the IDEA’s overall 
purpose and the way it is being enforced today. 
A.  The California State Constitution 
While the Constitution does not guarantee youth the right to a 
public education, almost all states have constitutional provisions 
recognizing the importance of public education for all children 
within their state.29 Moreover, “every state has compulsory school 
 
 27. There has been much research, advocacy, and scholarship centered on juveniles 
incarcerated in juvenile facilities. The same cannot be said for juveniles incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities. For scholarship on the status of special education in juvenile facilities, see 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING HIGH-
QUALITY EDUCATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SECURE CARE SETTINGS (2014), http://www2.ed. 
gov/policy/gen/guid/correctional-education/guiding-principles.pdf; BARRY HOLMAN & JASON 
ZIEDENBERG, JUST. POL’Y INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF 
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES (2006), http://www. 
justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_rep_dangersofdetention_jj.pdf; Stefanie Low, Comment, 
Improving the Education of California’s Juvenile Offenders: An Alternative to Consent Decrees, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 275 (2009). 
 28. See Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 699–701 (Wash. 2000). 
 29. Elizabeth Cate, Teach Your Children Well: Proposed Challenges to Inadequacies of 
Correctional Special Education for Juvenile Inmates, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 12 
98 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:93 
 
attendance laws.”30 For California, this means that children ages six 
through eighteen are required to attend some form of schooling.31 
And, in exchange for mandatory attendance, California courts have 
established that “[p]ublic education is an obligation, which the state 
assumed by the adoption of the Constitution . . . . [and] the 
opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be 
made available to all on an equal basis.”32 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that a property interest 
in education exists where states have mandated both the maintenance 
of a free, common school system and compulsory education.33 This 
property right, the Court has found, is protected by due process.34 
Thus, since California’s constitution and educational statutes do not 
specifically exempt incarcerated youth in their provisions, in theory, 
all incarcerated youth should enjoy the same guarantee of education 
as all other children in the state.35 In that regard, “[f]rom a textual 
standpoint, the applicable court precedents . . . that define the 
contours of the right to education should also apply,” to students in 
correctional contexts.36 
Although California case law remains silent on the subject, other 
states that have traditionally advanced public education as a 
fundamental right have, in the same stroke, denied this right to 
juveniles incarcerated in adult correctional facilities.37 For example, 
the Washington Supreme Court in Tunstall v. Bergeson38 held that 
the constitutional right to basic and special education did not apply to 
students incarcerated in adult facilities that were above the age of 
 
(2010); see also CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (stating the legislative policy behind the constitutional 
prerogative); Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, The IDEA of an Adequate Education for All: 
Ensuring Success for Incarcerated Youth with Disabilities, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 227, 231 (2013). 
 30. Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 231. 
 31. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2003) (“Each person between the ages of 6 and 18 
years not exempted . . . is subject to compulsory full-time education.”). 
 32. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1992). 
 33. Ely, supra note 25, at 817. 
 34. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (“[T]he State is constrained to recognize a 
student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by 
the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to 
the minimum procedures required by that Clause.”). 
 35. Katherine Twomey, Note, The Right to Education in Juvenile Detention Under State 
Constitutions, 94 VA. L. REV. 765, 795 (2008). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 699–701 (Wash. 2000). 
 38. Id. 
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eighteen.39 Thus, while minors held in Washington correctional 
facilities are entitled to an education, students above the age of 
eighteen are denied this right based on the Court’s strict 
interpretation of the term “children.”40 
Unlike Washington, California courts have yet to hear a case 
regarding the constitutional right to education for individuals 
incarcerated in adult prisons.41 However, they have unequivocally 
found that individuals incarcerated in juvenile facilities are 
constitutionally entitled to basic and special education.42 It is unclear 
whether California courts will follow Washington’s Tunstall 
example, or whether they will unambiguously extend California’s 
constitutional right to special education beyond juvenile facilities.43 
B.  The IDEA 
The IDEA, originally titled the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975,44 was enacted in order to improve educational 
results for children with disabilities.45 Before its enactment, children 
with disabilities across the country were unable to meaningfully 
acquire public education because they “did not receive appropriate 
educational services,”46 or else were “excluded entirely from the 
public school system and from being educated with their peers.”47 
Thus, the IDEA promises that all students with disabilities “are 
entitled to receive a free appropriate public education that 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet 
 
 39. Id. at 701 (“[T]he common understanding of the definition of ‘children’ for most 
purposes in Washington, including education, includes individuals up to age 18. Consequently, 
we hold that the term ‘children’ under article IX includes individuals up to age 18.”). 
 40. Id. at 710 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“By manipulating the definition of ‘child,’ the 
majority denies Washington children their constitutional right to education and equal protection 
of the law.”). 
 41. But see L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 778 (Cal. 2013) (finding that 
individuals under the age of twenty-two, incarcerated in county jails, are entitled to special 
education provided that they meet all IDEA requirements). 
 42. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224.71(n) (West 2016); see Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 
951 (Cal. 1977) (“education is a fundamental interest”); Anna L. Benvenue, Comment, Turning 
Troubled Teens into Career Criminals: Can California Reform the System to Rehabilitate Its 
Youth Offenders?, 38 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 33, 43 (2007). 
 43. Garcia has already extended the right to special education to individuals below the age 
of twenty-two that are incarcerated in county jails. 314 P.3d at 767, 772–73. 
 44. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006). 
 45. Id. § 1400(c)(3). 
 46. Id. § 1400(c)(2)(A). 
 47. Id. § 1400(c)(2)(B). 
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their unique needs and prepare them for further education, 
employment, and independent living.”48 
Under the IDEA, a state is entitled to receive federal financial 
assistance for educating students with disabilities, ages three through 
twenty-one.49 In order to receive these funds, the state must 
implement and maintain policies and procedures that ensure the 
provision of a free appropriate public education50 in the least 
restrictive environment51 to all students with disabilities residing 
within its boundaries, subject to some important exceptions.52 In 
practice, states must have procedures in place to find and assess 
potential individuals,53 determine whether a student is eligible for 
special education, and create and implement individualized education 
programs that conform to IDEA requirements.54 
Furthermore, the IDEA applies to all eligible students within 
states that receive federal funding support for the education of 
students with disabilities.55 The U.S. Department of Education 
recently reiterated this point in a Dear Colleague Letter56 that stated: 
Absent a specific exception, all IDEA protections apply to 
students with disabilities in correctional facilities . . . the 
fact that a student has been charged with or convicted of a 
crime does not diminish his or her substantive rights or the 
procedural safeguards and remedies provided under the 
 
 48. Id. § 1400(d)(1). 
 49. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
 50. The term “free appropriate public education,” as defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2004), 
is special education and related services provided under public supervision and at public expense 
that conform with state educational standards and the individual’s individualized education 
program (“IEP”). 
 51. The least restrictive environment, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2004), means that, 
“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or 
private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled.” 
 52. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2004); see id. § 1401(3) (defining “child with a disability”). 
 53. This process is commonly referred to as “child find.” See id. § 1412(a)(3) (2004). 
 54. Id. § 1412(a) (2004). An “individualized education program” (“IEP”) means “a written 
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance 
with section 20 USC § 1414(d).” Id. § 1401(14). 
 55. Id. § 1412(a); see also L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 772 (Cal. 2013) 
(“One of the conditions for a state’s receipt of federal funding under the IDEA is its assurance 
that a ‘free appropriate public education’ is available to all qualified students residing in the 
state.”). 
 56. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(e) (2004). Dear Colleague Letters are “informal guidance . . . not 
legally binding” that represent “the interpretation by the Department of Education of the 
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.” Id. 
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IDEA.57 
Therefore, students in correctional facilities are entitled to the 
provision of a free appropriate public education under the IDEA.58 
However, as the Dear Colleague letter notes, “not all students with 
disabilities are receiving the special education and related services to 
which they are entitled,” in correctional facilities.59 
III.  IDEA LOOPHOLES FOR THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 
TO POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE INMATES 
There are several IDEA provisions that modify the rights of 
individuals incarcerated in adult correctional facilities without giving 
adult penal institutions the flexibility to deny special education 
altogether.60 These provisions include: exclusion from state and 
district assessments,61 termination of the right to transitional services 
if the inmate will not be released before their IDEA eligibility 
ceases,62 and cessation of the right to a free appropriate public 
education in the least restrictive environment.63 There is no doubt 
that the preceding provisions are harmful to the overall quality and 
adequacy of special education in adult correctional facilities. 
However, the IDEA provisions discussed below are commonly used 
by adult correctional facilities to avoid providing special education 
altogether to eligible students. 
A.  If the Provision of Special Education Would Be 
Inconsistent with State Law or Practice 
Under the IDEA, the obligation to provide a free appropriate 
public education to students with disabilities does not apply to 
individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two if it “would be 
inconsistent with State law or practice.”64 Generally, courts have 
interpreted this exception to permit states to limit the guarantee of 
special education to entire age ranges, as opposed to particular 
 
 57. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(A)(i)–(ii), 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012). 
 61. Id. § 1414(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(i) (2012). 
 62. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(ii) (2012). 
 63. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(ii)(2)(ii) (2012). 
 64. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004). 
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subsets in age groups.65 Accordingly, under this exception, states 
cannot limit the provision of special education to students aged 
eighteen through twenty-two who are incarcerated in correctional 
facilities without limiting the provision of special education to all 
students aged eighteen through twenty-two in general.66 
Despite this statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court of 
Washington, in Tunstall, held that students in adult correctional 
facilities over the age of eighteen were ineligible for the provision of 
special education under the IDEA.67 The court reasoned that the 
inmate class was outside “the common school system,” and thus not 
covered under Washington’s basic and special education statutes.68 
Consequently, the provision of special education to these individuals 
under the IDEA would be “inconsistent with State law or practice,” 
and thus inmates over eighteen years old were not guaranteed such 
services under the IDEA.69 
Tunstall has been widely criticized as contrary to IDEA 
requirements.70 However, the Supreme Court denied review of the 
decision, thereby leaving open a mechanism for states to deny the 
provision of special education to students incarcerated in adult 
facilities.71 Nevertheless, several California education statutes and a 
California Supreme Court case suggest that California courts will not 
follow Tunstall.72 
For example, section 56000 of the California Education Code 
states: 
It is the . . . intent of the Legislature to ensure that all 
individuals with exceptional needs are provided their rights 
to appropriate programs and services . . . under the federal 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act . . . . [and] that 
this part does not abrogate any rights provided to 
 
 65. Thomas A. Mayes, Denying Special Education in Adult Correctional Facilities: A Brief 
Critique of Tunstall v. Bergeson, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 193, 201 (2003). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 706 (Wash. 2000). To be clear, this holding does not 
extend to students aged eighteen to twenty-two that are not incarcerated. 
 68. Id. at 698–99. 
 69. Id. at 706. 
 70. Lindsay McAleer, Note, Litigation Strategies for Demanding High Quality Education 
for Incarcerated Youth: Lessons from State School Finance Litigation, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 545, 563 (2015); Ely, supra note 25, at 815–17; see Mayes, supra note 65, at 194. 
 71. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 532 U.S. 920 (2001). 
 72. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 768 (Cal. 2013); see CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 56000 (West 2003). 
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individuals with exceptional needs.73 
The California legislature intended to incorporate the full rights and 
protections set forth in the IDEA.74 The IDEA allows for the 
provision of special education to students in adult correctional 
facilities, provided they meet certain prerequisites.75 As such, 
California should be providing those same services to individuals 
incarcerated in California adult correctional facilities. 
Additionally, in Los Angeles Unified School District v. Garcia,76 
the California Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that eligible 
students not exempted by IDEA prerequisites are entitled to receive a 
free appropriate public education in California county jails.77 Garcia 
raised the issue of which agency is responsible for providing special 
education to individuals incarcerated in county jails.78 The California 
Supreme Court held that the responsibility for providing these 
services is governed by section 56041 of the California Education 
Code, which states: 
[I]f it is determined by the individualized education 
program team that special education services are required 
beyond the pupil’s 18th birthday, the district of residence 
responsible for providing special education and related 
services to pupils between the ages of 18 to 22 years, 
inclusive, . . . [is] the last district of residence in effect prior 
to the pupil’s attaining the age of majority . . . as long as 
and until the parent or parents relocate to a new district of 
residence.79 
Although the California Legislature has specifically delineated the 
entities responsible for providing special education in similar 
institutional settings, such as juvenile court schools, it “has not 
 
 73. EDUC. § 56000. 
 74. Id. The California legislature’s intention is to provide California students with the same 
rights that they would have under the IDEA; they wish to neither abrogate nor enlarge these 
rights. See id. 
 75. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1. 
 76. 314 P.3d 767 (Cal. 2013). 
 77. Id. at 772 (“In the present matter, there is no dispute that, under the IDEA and the 
California statutes that implement its policies . . . Garcia[] was entitled to continue to receive a 
[free appropriate public education] while incarcerated in county jail: He was under the age of 22 
years, had not received a high school diploma or otherwise met prescribed goals, and, prior to his 
incarceration, he had been identified as a disabled student and had an individualized educational 
program.”). 
 78. Id. at 773. 
 79. EDUC. § 56041. 
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adopted a similar narrow statute applicable to the county jail 
setting.”80 In its absence, the agency responsible for providing 
special education in the county jail setting is the local educational 
agency in which the incarcerated student’s parent resides.81 
Accordingly, Garcia is significant for two reasons. First, it 
explicitly states that youth incarcerated in California jails are entitled 
to special education under the IDEA.82 This proposition extends to 
all qualified youth in adult correctional facilities83—basic rights 
under the IDEA do not end when a juvenile is incarcerated in an 
adult correctional facility.84 Consequently, it is unlikely that a 
California court will find the provision of special education to 
individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two “inconsistent with 
state law or practice.”85 
Second, Garcia assigns responsibility for the provision of 
special education for youth in county jails to the school districts 
where their parents reside.86 This delegation raises logistical 
questions as to how school districts will work together with each 
other, and with the correctional institution, to provide a free 
appropriate public education to students under their responsibility.87 
With the issue raised, there may be more attention on if, and to what 
standard, special education is provided to youth in adult correctional 
facilities. 
B.  Exemption from Certain Child Find Procedures 
Another exception to the general guarantee of a free appropriate 
public education for students with disabilities specifically targets 
 
 80. Garcia, 314 P.3d at 780. 
 81. Id. at 775. 
 82. Id. at 780 (“An individual with a qualifying disability who is between the ages of 18 and 
22 years and has met certain specified prerequisites is entitled to continue his or her special 
education program while incarcerated in a county jail.”). 
 83. Id. at 772. The Garcia court discusses only two exceptions to the general special 
education entitlement: either the student has received a regular high school diploma or the 
student, before his or her incarceration, was not identified as a child with a disability or did not 
have an IEP. Id. Thus, if the individual has been previously identified as a child with a disability 
and has not yet received a high school diploma, the CA Supreme Court implicitly states that he or 
she is entitled to the provision of special education in adult penal institutions. Id. 
 84. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1 (“[T]he fact that a student has been charged 
with or convicted of a crime does not diminish his or her substantive rights or the procedural 
safeguards and remedies provided under the IDEA to students with disabilities . . . .”). 
 85. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004). 
 86. Garcia, 314 P.3d at 774. 
 87. Id. at 779. 
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individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two in adult correctional 
facilities.88 Under the IDEA, if individuals were not previously 
identified as having a disability or did not have an IEP in their 
previous educational placement, they are not entitled to receive 
special education in adult correctional facilities.89 
In effect, this provision exempts adult penal institutions from 
performing child find procedures for inmates between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-two.90 However, as the U.S. Department of 
Education makes clear, “States must make [free appropriate public 
education] available to students with disabilities in adult prisons who 
do not fall into that exception. Therefore, States and local 
educational agencies [] must include in its child find system, those 
incarcerated youth who would be eligible to receive [a free 
appropriate public education].”91 This includes those incarcerated 
individuals that are below the age of eighteen in adult correctional 
facilities.92 Thus, adult penal institutions are not entirely exempt 
from child find procedures; inmates who have been previously 
identified as children with disabilities, as well as those below the age 
of eighteen, must be identified and evaluated for special education.93 
Adult penal institutions, however, currently apply this provision 
to circumvent their child find obligation to eligible individuals.94 The 
institutional characteristics of prisons, with their punitive focus, do 
not lend themselves to ensuring that the educational needs of its 
inmates are met.95 Richard Morris and Kristin Thompson, professors 
of special education and disability at the University of Arizona, 
noted that, “it is frequently reported that . . . the school records of 
incarcerated youths are difficult to obtain from their regular public 
school to ensure continuity of needed services and IEP 
implementation.”96 Additionally, confusion regarding the agency 
 
 88. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2004). 
 89. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii); see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56040(b) (West 2003); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.102(a)(2) (2008). 
 90. Letter from Stephanie Smith Lee, Dir., Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. Serv., U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., to Geoffrey A. Yudien, Legal Counsel, Vt. Dep’t of Educ. (Aug. 19, 2003) 
[hereinafter IDEA Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2003-3/yudien081 
903fape3q2003.pdf. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004). 
 93. IDEA Letter, supra note 90, at 1–2. 
 94. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 8 n.20. 
 95. Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 235–38. 
 96. Richard J. Morris & Kristin C. Thompson, Juvenile Delinquency and Special Education 
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responsible for the provision of special education often delays, if not 
dispels, service delivery altogether.97 If adult correctional facilities 
do not have a child find system in place, qualified individuals may be 
denied a free appropriate public education simply because they 
remain unidentified.98 Therefore, even though this provision allows 
adult correctional facilities to dispense with their child find duty in 
some limited instances, these institutions continue to have an 
obligation to find unidentified, but qualified, individuals both above 
and below eighteen years of age.99 
Many adult correctional facilities, however, do not have child 
find procedures in place.100 Indeed, this specific exception to the 
IDEA mandate of special education has been criticized because 
“[p]roper identification of youth with special education needs [and] 
exposure to special education curriculum . . . should be available to 
juveniles in adult prisons as well as those in juveniles facilities.”101 
C.  Modification of a Child’s IEP or Placement 
Under the IDEA, a student’s IEP or placement can be modified 
in light of certain demonstrated safety or penological 
considerations.102 Specifically, the IDEA states that if a child with a 
disability “is convicted as an adult under State law and incarcerated 
in an adult prison, the child’s IEP Team may modify the child’s IEP 
or placement . . . if the State has demonstrated a bona fide security or 
compelling penological interest that cannot otherwise be 
accommodated.”103 
This provision differs from the exceptions discussed above in 
two significant ways. First, it applies to youth of all ages incarcerated 
 
Laws: Policy Implementation Issues and Directions for Future Research, 59 J. CORR. EDUC. 173, 
175–76 (2008). 
 97. See also Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 2 (“Challenges such as overcrowding, 
frequent transfers in and out of facilities, lack of qualified teachers, inability to address gaps in 
students’ education, and lack of collaboration with the LEA contribute to the problem.”); cf. 
Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 236–37 (discussing this issue in the context of juvenile 
correctional facilities). 
 98. Cate, supra note 29, at 17 (“As young students’ disabilities are often undetected . . . this 
provision has the potential to deny special education to a large number of incarcerated youth.”). 
 99. IDEA Letter, supra note 90, at 1–2. 
 100. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 8. 
 101. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT, 67 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf. 
 102. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324 (2012). 
 103. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324. 
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in adult correctional facilities.104 If a penal institution demonstrates a 
bona fide security or compelling penological interest, students’ IEPs 
may be modified or abrogated.105 Second, it applies only to youth 
who have already been convicted as adults under state law and 
incarcerated in adult prisons.106 The provision does not apply to 
youth in jails being held in pre-trial detention.107 
Only one federal district court—the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in 2015—has analyzed this provision’s scope.108 In 
Buckley v. State Correctional Institution-Pine Grove,109 the court 
found that the “[u]se of the adjective ‘bona fide’ indicates that any 
security interest must be actual or genuine to the student, as opposed 
to theoretical.”110 Thus, the security interest must be particular to the 
student and not based upon a blanket policy applicable to all inmates 
at a certain security level.111 
Moreover, “the established safety concern must be of such a 
quality that it ‘cannot otherwise be accommodated.’”112 Buckley held 
that “a student’s IEP must be implemented as drafted where a bona 
fide security interest exists and can be accommodated.”113 
Additionally, commentary by the Department of Education iterated 
that a compelling security or penological interest does not include 
budgetary or funding concerns: “States must accommodate the costs 
and administrative requirements of educating all eligible individuals 
with disabilities.”114 
Even when a bona fide security or compelling penological 
interest exists, however, this provision only grants correctional 
facilities the ability to modify an existing IEP or placement.115 The 
 
 104. IDEA Letter, supra note 90, at 2. 
 105. Buckley v. State Corr. Inst.-Pine Grove, 98 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
 106. Id. at 715; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (“If a child with a disability is incarcerated, 
but is not convicted as an adult under State law and is not incarcerated in an adult prison, the 
requirements of the Act apply.”); IDEA Letter, supra note 90. 
 107. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 772 (Cal. 2013). 
 108. See Buckley, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 704. 
 109. 98 F. Supp. 3d 704 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
 110. Id. at 715. 
 111. See 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,577 (Mar. 12, 1999) (“A definition of the terms ‘bona fide 
security or compelling penological interest’ is not appropriate, given the individualized nature of 
the determination and the countless variables that may impact on the determination.”). 
 112. Buckley, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 715. 
 113. Id. at 715–16. 
 114. 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,577 (Mar. 12, 1999). 
 115. Buckley, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 718. 
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Buckley court held that the provision does not give IEP teams at adult 
correctional facilities “carte blanche to denude an IEP of special 
education services . . . . [A]n education program should be revised, 
not annulled.”116 Accordingly, adult penal institutions that follow the 
law may not terminate an individual’s right to special education 
altogether.117 In reality, as the Buckley court noted, “youth with 
disabilities, who are incarcerated at disproportionate rates, often are 
denied their right to an appropriate education while 
institutionalized.”118 
D.  Penalties in the Event of IDEA Violations 
The IDEA provision concerning the consequences of an IDEA 
violation in adult correctional facilitates is perhaps the most harmful 
mechanism that adult prisons use in order to avoid providing a free 
appropriate public education to IDEA-eligible inmates. Generally, 
the state educational agency oversees all local educational agencies 
within the state and ensures that they are in compliance with the 
IDEA.119 If a local educational agency fails to provide a free 
appropriate public education to eligible students, the state 
educational agency shares the blame.120 However, in the case of adult 
prisons: 
[T]he Governor (or another individual pursuant to State 
law), . . . may assign to any public agency in the State the 
responsibility of ensuring that the requirements . . . are met 
with respect to children with disabilities who are convicted 
as adults under State law and incarcerated in adult 
prisons.”121 
States may transfer their supervisory responsibility for IDEA 
compliance in adult correctional facilities to another agency, such as 
the state department of corrections.122 Consequently, states’ 
responsibility, and more importantly, the consequences for IDEA 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 720. 
 119. 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (2012) (States are required to “monitor implementation of this 
subchapter by local educational agencies; and enforce this part . . . .”). 
 120. Id. § 1416. For a review of all the enforcement mechanisms available to the Secretary of 
Education, see 20 U.S.C. § 1416(d)–(e). 
 121. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(C) (2004). 
 122. Mayes, supra note 65, at 198. 
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violations in the adult prison context, are severely abrogated.123 
The Secretary of Education has limited disciplinary measures for 
IDEA violations when an agency—other than the state educational 
agency—is assigned responsibility for eligible students in adult 
prisons: 
[T]he Secretary . . . shall take appropriate corrective action 
to ensure compliance with this subchapter, except that . . . 
any reduction or withholding of payments to the State shall 
be proportionate to the total funds allotted . . . to the State as 
the number of eligible children with disabilities in adult 
prisons under the supervision of the other public agency . . . 
[and] any withholding of funds . . . shall be limited to the 
specific agency responsible for the failure to comply with 
this subchapter.124 
The Secretary of Education’s withholding power is one of the 
principal enforcement mechanisms to ensure IDEA compliance.125 
But this power is limited where IDEA violations occur in the prison 
context.126 Any funding reduction must be in an amount 
proportionate to the number of eligible students under the agency’s 
responsibility, relative to the total number of IDEA-eligible students 
in the state.127 Thus, if the agency systematically violates the IDEA, 
the state’s overall funding is not in jeopardy.128 In turn, adult penal 
institutions have less motivation to provide special education to 
eligible youth within their facilities. 
It is important to note that the Secretary of Education’s power to 
withhold is limited only to where youth are convicted and held in 
adult prisons.129 As stated in Garcia, school-aged youth incarcerated 
in adult jails, either pre-adjudication or afterward, are entitled to a 
free appropriate public education provided by the local educational 
agency where their parents reside.130 
Nonetheless, adult correctional facilities use this exception, and 
 
 123. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2004). 
 124. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h) (2012). 
 125. Id. § 1416(e). 
 126. Id. § 1416(h); see id. § 1412(a)(11)(c). 
 127. Id. § 1416(h); Cate, supra note 29, at 19; see H.R. REP. NO. 105–649, at 3 (1998); 71 
Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,802 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
 128. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h); Cate, supra note 29, at 19. 
 129. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h). 
 130. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 775 (Cal. 2013). 
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those discussed above, to circumvent providing school-aged youth in 
their institutions with a free appropriate public education.131 While 
some of these institutions adhere to the letter of the law, all fail to 
observe the underlying principles of the IDEA—that a free 
appropriate public education should be available to all children with 
disabilities.132 Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that “education 
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We 
cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when 
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills 
upon which our social order rests.”133 
IV.  TRANSFER LAWS AND THEIR SERIOUS EFFECTS ON YOUTH 
Several IDEA provisions allow adult correctional facilities to 
bypass the provision of special education to school-aged youth in 
adult correctional facilities.134 But how do legal minors end up in the 
“adult” criminal justice system in the first place? Normally, “[s]tate 
juvenile courts with delinquency jurisdiction handle cases in which 
‘juveniles’135 are accused of acts that would be crimes if ‘adults’ 
committed them.”136 Essentially, individuals accused of committing 
crimes before the age of eighteen are usually under the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile justice system.137 Those individuals accused of crimes 
after they turn eighteen enter the criminal justice system.138 
However, “[a]ll 50 states and the District of Columbia have legal 
mechanisms for trying juveniles as adults in criminal court.”139 The 
 
 131. All four provisions of the IDEA discussed above are meant to restrict the provision of 
special education in specific, limited circumstances. 
 132. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2004) (The purpose of this act is “to ensure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes 
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for 
further education, employment, and independent living.”). 
 133. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
 134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2004); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7) (2012). 
 135. Here, the term “juvenile” is limited; it means legal minors below the age of eighteen 
nationally, and below the age of seventeen in California. 
 136. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and 
Reporting, JUV. OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT. REP. SERIES, Sept. 2011, at 2, https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 603 (West 2015) (stating that juvenile courts 
have original jurisdiction over individuals below the age of eighteen unless the alleged crime is 
one listed in section 707.01 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code); CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 606 (West 2016) (stating that cases involving minors must be filed in juvenile court 
unless other provisions apply). 
 139. Jason J. Washburn et al., Detained Youth Processed in Juvenile and Adult Court: 
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different types of transfer laws and their particular forms in 
California are discussed in subsection A. 
Transfer laws increase the amount of incarcerated individuals in 
adult penal institutions who are eligible for special education under 
the IDEA. Subsection B explores the many negative consequences 
associated with incarcerating youth in adult facilities. Moreover, in 
light of the damaging effects of incarceration on youth, the provision 
of special education in adult correctional facilities can help mitigate 
these negative consequences. 
A.  Transfer Laws 
There are three primary categories of transfer laws that can be 
found in most states.140 These include, but are not limited to, judicial 
waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and statutory exclusion laws.141 
1.  Judicial Waiver Laws 
Judicial waiver laws permit juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction 
for certain cases, thereby opening the way for criminal 
prosecution.142 Waiver determinations are made at formal hearings 
and require that minimum standards be met.143 Factors such as the 
nature of the alleged crime and the accused individual’s “age, 
maturity, history, and rehabilitative prospects” are taken into 
account.144 Nevertheless, cases subject to waiver may usually be 
transferred to a criminal court based on a judge’s discretion and 
“[w]aiver thresholds are often quite low . . . .”145 Some states, 
though, make waiver presumptive for certain crimes or else designate 
specific sets of circumstances where waiver is mandatory.146 
To illustrate, under presumptive waiver laws, “a juvenile who 
meets age, offense, or other statutory thresholds . . . must present 
 
Psychiatric Disorders and Mental Health Needs, JUV. JUST. BULL., Sept. 2015, at 2, http://www. 
ojjdp.gov/pubs/248283.pdf. 
 140. Sarah Hockenberry & Charles Puzzanchera, Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal 
Court, 2011, JUV. OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT. REP. SERIES, Dec. 2014, at 29, http://www.ojjdp. 
gov/pubs/248410.pdf. 
 141. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 2. 
 142. Id. (“A total of 45 states have laws designating some category of cases in which waiver 
of jurisdiction may be considered.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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evidence rebutting the presumption, or the court will grant waiver 
and the case will be tried in criminal court.”147 Under mandatory 
waiver laws, juvenile courts must waive jurisdiction over cases that 
meet specific age, offense or prior record criteria.148 The court’s only 
function under mandatory waiver laws is to ensure that the 
requirements are met.149 
In the past, judicial waiver was the primary mechanism that 
juvenile courts used to transfer youth to criminal court.150 The 
circumstances have changed today with the proliferation of other 
transfer laws.151 Indeed, although the proportion of juvenile cases in 
which prosecutors seek waiver is unknown,152 there has been a 
definitive decline over the last decade in the number of cases that are 
judicially waived to criminal court.153 Today, the primary methods 
for transferring juveniles to the adult criminal justice system are 
through prosecutorial discretion laws and statutory exclusion laws.154 
In California, discretionary judicial waiver is available in any 
case where a minor is accused of violating any criminal statute or 
ordinance and is sixteen years of age or older.155 The juvenile court, 
upon the prosecution’s motion, may consider whether the individual 
is “a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court 
law.”156 If the court finds that the minor is not amendable to the care 
and services provided through juvenile justice system facilities, then 
the court may waive the case to criminal court.157 This determination 
is based on: the “degree of criminal sophistication” demonstrated by 
the minor,158 “whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the 
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction,”159 “the minor’s 
previous delinquent history,”160 and the “circumstances and gravity” 
 
 147. Id. at 4. Presumptive waiver laws exist in fifteen states. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. Fifteen states have mandatory waiver. Id. 
 150. Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 2. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Griffin et al., supra note 136. 
 153. Hockenberry & Puzzanchera, supra note 140, at 3. 
 154. Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 2. 
 155. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 2016). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. § 707(a)(1)(A). 
 159. Id. § 707(a)(1)(B). 
 160. Id. § 707(a)(1)(C). 
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of the alleged offense.161 
Additionally, although California does not have any mandatory 
judicial waiver laws, its presumptive judicial waiver laws are quite 
broad.162 Presumptive waiver is required where a minor has 
previously committed murder or one of the statutorily enumerated 
sex offenses, and is then accused of another felony offense when he 
or she is over the age of sixteen.163 In those cases, a minor shall be 
presumed not “a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the 
juvenile court law,” unless the juvenile court concludes, based on 
evidence, that the individual would be amendable to the care and 
services available through the juvenile justice system.164 This 
determination is based on the same factors considered in 
discretionary waiver but the standard is much stricter.165 The court 
must make a favorable finding as to every factor listed.166 However, 
presumptive waiver only applies if the minor is found to have 
committed two or more felony offenses when he or she was above 
the age of fourteen.167 Overall, from 2003 to 2008, 40% of 
documented transfers in California were through judicial waivers.168 
2.  Prosecutorial Discretion Laws 
Prosecutorial discretion laws, also known as concurrent 
jurisdiction laws, refer to the types of cases that may be brought in 
either the juvenile justice system or the criminal justice system 
depending on prosecutorial discretion.169 For these types of cases, a 
hearing is not necessary to determine which court is appropriate as 
there may be little or no formal standards for making that decision.170 
In California, the prosecutor may choose to file a case in a 
criminal court if the alleged offense was committed by a minor aged 
sixteen or above and if the alleged offense is one of the crimes listed 
 
 161. Id. § 707(a)(1)(E). 
 162. See Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 3. 
 163. See WELF. & INST. § 707(a)(2). 
 164. Id. § 707(a)(2)(B). 
 165. See id. § 707(a)(2)(B). 
 166. Id. § 707(a)(2)(B). 
 167. Id. § 707(a)(2)(A). 
 168. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 18–19. But “currently, only 13 states publicly report the 
total number of their transfers.” Id. at 1. 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Id. at 2–5 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion laws are usually silent regarding standards, 
protocols, or appropriate considerations for decision making.”). But see WELF. & INST. § 707(d) 
(enumerating standards and protocols for prosecutorial discretion in California). 
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in subdivision (b) section 707 of the California Welfare and 
Institutions Code.171 Additionally, the prosecutor may file a case in 
criminal court if the minor is above the age of sixteen and has not 
currently committed one of the listed crimes, but has previously 
committed one.172 Moreover, the prosecutor has discretion to file a 
case in criminal court for minors above the age of fourteen when 
certain circumstances apply.173 
3.  Statutory Exclusion Laws 
Statutory exclusion laws, also known as automatic transfers, 
“exclude juveniles from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court solely 
on the basis of the type of offense, criminal history, and age of the 
youth.”174 Thus, criminal courts gain exclusive jurisdiction over 
certain crimes involving juvenile offenders; if the case “falls within a 
statutory exclusion category, it must be filed originally in criminal 
court.”175 Murder and sexual crimes are the most common types of 
offenses designated in statutory exclusion laws.176 Twenty-nine 
states have statutes that exclude juveniles from the jurisdiction of 
juvenile courts simply because they meet threshold requirements 
such as age, offense, or prior record criteria.177 
Subsection (b) of section 602 of the California Welfare and 
Institutions Code describes California’s policy on automatic 
transfers. The provision states that if any person fourteen years of 
age or older is accused of committing murder or certain listed sex 
offenses, he or she must be prosecuted under state criminal law in the 
“adult” criminal justice system.178 
Thus, school-aged youth may be tried as adults through legal 
mechanisms including judicial waiver, prosecutorial discretion, or 
 
 171. WELF. & INST. § 707(d). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. § 707(d)(2) (providing an in-depth review of the circumstances in which a 
prosecutor has discretion to file cases in criminal court for individuals ages fourteen and above). 
 174. Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 2. 
 175. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 2. 
 176. Id. at 6; Campaign for Youth Justice, The Consequences Aren’t Minor: The Impact of 
Trying Youth as Adults and Strategies for Reform, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 23 (Mar. 21, 
2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf 
(District attorneys are required to “file cases in adult criminal court for minors age 14 and older 
charged with either murder with special circumstances . . . or certain enumerated sex offenses.”). 
 177. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 6. 
 178. WELF. & INST. § 602(b). 
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statutory exclusion.179 The minimum age that youth may be 
transferred to the “adult” criminal justice system varies between 
states, but is fourteen in California.180 Additionally, any juvenile 
above the age of sixteen may be tried as an adult for any offense in 
California.181 Transfer laws have an extensive effect on the overall 
criminal justice system, in part because the incarceration of youth in 
adult correctional facilities is associated with negative outcomes for 
school-aged youth.182 
B.  The Consequences of Sentencing Youth as Adults 
National and state data are “fragmentary” on the numbers of 
school-aged youth incarcerated in adult jails and prisons.183 This is in 
part because there is no national dataset that tracks the amount of 
cases that are transferred to adult courts.184 Lower estimates of 
minors incarcerated in adult jails range from 4,000 to 7,500.185 
However, some researchers suggest that the actual number of 
juveniles held in adult jails “may be ten to twenty times higher than 
the daily estimate, given ‘turnover rates’ of youth funneled in and out 
of the system.”186 Additionally, little to no data has been collected 
concerning the number of juveniles incarcerated in adult correctional 
facilities besides jails.187 However, while the numbers are 
ambiguous, it is clear that a significant minority of school-aged 
youth188 in the United States are being held and incarcerated in adult 
 
 179. The Consequences Aren’t Minor: The Impact of Trying Youth as Adults and Strategies 
for Reform, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 5 (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.campaignforyouth 
justice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf [hereinafter Campaign for Youth 
Justice]. 
 180. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 211 (West 2016). 
 181. Id. § 707(a). 
 182. See, e.g., Ziedenberg, supra note 13, at 19−20. 
 183. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 12. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Compare Ely, supra note 25, at 797 (“Approximately 7,500 youths under eighteen are 
held in adult jails every day across the country.”), with Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Bureau of 
Just. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., 
June 11, 2015, at 1, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (“About 4,200 juveniles age 
17 or younger were held in local jails at midyear 2014.”). 
 186. Ely, supra note 25, at 798. 
 187. Id. In 2005, 4,775 youth under eighteen were incarcerated each day in state prisons. 
However, this number is under-inclusive because it does not include youth incarcerated in federal 
prisons and little information has been collected on the number of youth, aged eighteen to twenty-
two, that are incarcerated in state and federal prisons. Id. 
 188. The term “school-aged youth” is used here to refer to both minors and those individuals 
above the age of eighteen that are still entitled to rights under the IDEA. 
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jails and prisons.189 
There are a number of negative consequences associated with 
incarcerating youth in adult correctional facilities.190 Studies have 
confirmed that youth incarcerated in adult correctional facilities are 
more likely to reoffend than those retained in the juvenile justice 
system.191 Indeed, placing youth in adult correctional facilities often 
results in distorted attitudes towards antisocial behavior and an 
increased association with more “hardened” criminals.192 
Moreover, incarceration in adult facilities is expensive.193 In 
California, it costs about $674.55 a day or $246,210 a year to confine 
a young person.194 Additionally, the danger of self-harm, assault, and 
the occurrence of mental health conditions is much greater for youth 
in adult facilities.195 Indeed, “incarcerated youth experience from 
double to four times the suicide rate of youth in the community.”196 
Furthermore, there is a severe racial disparity in the demographics of 
youth that get transferred to adult criminal courts.197 Historically, 
racial and ethnic minority groups, particularly those from lower 
socio-economic classes, represent a disproportionate amount of 
juveniles transferred to the adult criminal justice system.198 
 
 189. Davis et al., supra note 12, at 21 (“In 2011, about 61,000 individuals below age 21 were 
incarcerated on any given day in the United States.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Ziedenberg, supra note 13 (discussing the safety, service, and cost challenges 
that arise when youth are detained in jails while awaiting trial). 
 191. Neelum Arya, Legislative Victories from 2005 to 2010: Removing Youth from the Adult 
Criminal Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 17 (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www. 
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf. (“[Y]outh who are 
transferred . . . to the adult criminal system are approximately 34% more likely than youth 
retained in the juvenile court system to be rearrested for violent or other crimes.”). For more 
information on the recidivism rates of youth incarcerated in adult correctional facilities, see, for 
example, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 
2014 NATIONAL REPORT, 111–12 (2014), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/downloads/NR 
2014.pdf. 
 192. Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America, 
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 7–8 (Nov. 2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/ 
documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf [hereinafter Jailing Juveniles]. 
 193. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 27, at 10–11. 
 194. Factsheet: The Tip of the Iceberg: What Taxpayers Pay to Incarcerate Youth, JUST. 
POL’Y INST. 2 (Mar. 2015), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/ 
factsheet_costs_of_confinement.pdf. 
 195. See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 192. 
 196. HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 27, at 9. 
 197. See SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., 
DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2013 20–27 (2015), 
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/jcsreports/jcs2013.pdf. 
 198. Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 3. 
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This Note’s discussion concerning the negative effects of 
incarceration on juveniles is nowhere near exhaustive. Numerous 
advocacy groups have discussed the adverse consequences of 
transfer laws and their effect on America’s juvenile population.199 
However, there has been limited dialogue concerning education, 
particularly special education, and its ability to mitigate many of the 
negative consequences of incarceration in adult prisons.200 
“Although many factors account for why some formerly 
incarcerated adults and youth succeed and some don’t, lack of 
education and skills is one key reason.”201 Conversely, improved 
school performance is associated with a reduction in criminality and 
delinquency.202 Moreover, researchers have found that a 
disproportionate amount of incarcerated youth have learning 
disabilities and are in need of special education.203 Not only would 
providing special education to youth incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities substantially reduce recidivism rates,204 it 
would also be more cost effective.205 Davis suggests that there would 
be a “savings of five dollars on reincarceration costs for every dollar 
spent on correctional education.”206 Special education in adult 
correctional facilities also emphasizes the potential for rehabilitation 
and strengthens the criminal justice system’s deterrence goals.207 
In theory, youth incarcerated in adult jails and prisons have the 
opportunity for a structured environment emphasizing learning and 
future planning.208 As argued throughout this Note, however, special 
 
 199. See Campaign for Youth Justice, supra note 179, at 23. 
 200. See Davis et al., supra note 12, at iii (“Correctional education . . . reduces the risk of 
post-release reincarceration . . . and does so cost-effectively . . . . And when it comes to post-
release employment for adults . . . researchers find that correctional education may increase such 
employment.”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. KATHERINE A. CARLSON & MICHELLE M. MAIKE, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. 
INSTRUCTION, WASH., EDUCATING JUVENILES IN ADULT JAILS: A PROGRAM GUIDE 12 (2013), 
http://www.k12.wa.us/InstitutionalEd/pubdocs/EducatingJuvenilesInAdultJails.pdf. 
 203. Davis et al., supra note 12, at 22 (“[B]etween 30 and 50 percent of incarcerated youth 
have special education disabilities, as compared with approximately 10 percent of non-
incarcerated youth.”). 
 204. Ely, supra note 25, at 807; Davis et al., supra note 12, at iii. 
 205. Davis et al., supra note 12, at iii. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Mayes, supra note 65, at 208–09. 
 208. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1 (“[T]he fact that a student has been charged 
with or convicted of a crime does not diminish his or her substantive rights or the procedural 
safeguards and remedies provided under the IDEA to students with disabilities and their 
parents.”). 
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education in the adult correctional facility context does not meet 
minimally adequate standards.209 Indeed, adult penal institutions 
“may fail to offer educational programs at all, may provide programs 
run by entities ill-equipped to educate school-aged youth, or may 
have insufficient resources to provide appropriate services.”210 As of 
2000, only 40% of state prisons, 60% of federal prisons, 22% of 
private prisons, and 11% of jails provided special education 
programs to their inmates.211 Thus, despite federal statutes and state 
constitutional prerogatives, adult correctional facilities continue to 
violate the educational rights of incarcerated juveniles.212 
V.  LEGISLATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
The adequate provision of special education to eligible juveniles 
incarcerated in adult facilities is currently inadequate. Individuals 
below the age of eighteen, and those between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-two, experience institutional reluctance when attempting 
to obtain the free appropriate public education to which they are 
entitled. However, this is not a new phenomenon.213 For years, 
advocates have been trying to bring the provision of special 
education in adult correctional facilities up to minimally adequate 
levels.214 
There are many possible avenues to improve upon the provision 
of special education in adult correctional facilities.215 This Note 
argues for legislation as a solution to this issue. 
Because much of special education law is rooted in statutes, 
legislative advocacy is an essential tool for advocates against special 
education inadequacy in adult correctional facilities.216 Activists 
need to argue for clarification and reduction of the IDEA exceptions 
so that adult penal institutions will not improperly broaden their 
scope. For example, in its current state, the statutory framework for 
the IDEA differentiates between individuals incarcerated in adult 
 
 209. Ely, supra note 25, at 809–11. 
 210. Id. at 801. 
 211. Harlow, supra note 24, at 4. 
 212. See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 192, at 4. 
 213. Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 235. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See, e.g., Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 272–74 (arguing for more research to 
develop effective ways of incentivizing correctional facilities to comply with the law); Ely, supra 
note 25, at 828–32 (arguing for school finance litigation “adequacy” claims). 
 216. Cate, supra note 29, at 35. 
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correctional facilities and those incarcerated in juvenile correctional 
facilities.217 Its measures limit the provision of special education for 
those individuals incarcerated in adult, but not juvenile, facilities.218 
However, this distinction is unrealistic. As discussed above, the 
decision to transfer youth to the adult criminal justice system is often 
discretionary.219 This discretion, in turn, permits judicial officers and 
prosecutors to decide the quality of education that juveniles will 
receive; the decision to prosecute juveniles as adults and incarcerate 
them in adult facilities is a decision that currently delivers these 
individuals to institutions with inadequate special education 
services.220 
Additionally, the IDEA limitations discussed above are not 
compatible with the overall purpose of the IDEA, which asserts that 
all youth with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public 
education.221 Moreover, as currently utilized, adult correctional 
facilities use these IDEA limitations to eliminate the provision of 
special education altogether.222 As such, amending the IDEA to 
clarify and reduce the four IDEA loophole provisions would improve 
outcomes for all juveniles with disabilities and ensure compliance 
with the overall purpose of the IDEA. 
First, the “inconsistent with State law or practice”223 exception 
should be amended to ensure that the Tunstall example is not 
followed.224 The statutory language of this provision needs to clearly 
 
 217. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004) (allowing states to limit the provision of 
special education if it would be inconsistent with state law or practice), id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
(exempting adult correctional facilities from the child find obligation in limited circumstances), 
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012) (allowing modifications of an incarcerated individual’s IEP in 
certain circumstances), and id. § 1416(h) (limiting the withholding power of the Secretary of 
Education in the context of adult penal institutions), with CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224.71 
(West 2016) (promising all individuals incarcerated in juvenile facilities a quality education that 
complies with state law). 
 218. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2004). 
 219. See discussion supra Part IV (detailing the different types of transfer laws and how they 
are applied). 
 220. See Ziedenberg, supra note 13, at 23 (“With the adult conviction they get no services, 
education . . . . The [juveniles tried as adults] population does not belong to anyone . . . neither 
adult nor juvenile.”). 
 221. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2004). 
 222. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (discussing the current state of special 
education in adult correctional facilities). 
 223. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 224. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 708 (Wash. 2000) (holding that students in adult 
correctional facilities over the age of eighteen are ineligible for the provision of special education 
under the IDEA). 
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pronounce that states are permitted to limit the provision of special 
education to particular age groups but not merely to subsets within 
age groups. Thus, a state can decide that providing special education 
for all individuals above the age of eighteen is “inconsistent with 
state law or practice.”225 However, under this provision, states may 
not limit the provision of special education to those individuals 
above the age of eighteen in adult correctional facilities, without 
restricting this right to individuals not incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities.226 
Second, the provision limiting the child find obligation in adult 
correctional facilities should be eliminated altogether.227 In its 
current state, this provision allows adult penal institutions to dispel 
with their child find obligation for those individuals above the age of 
eighteen who have not previously been identified as a child with a 
disability.228 However, without active child find systems in place, 
many eligible students are denied special education simply because 
they remain unidentified.229 Eliminating this exception to the 
provision of a free appropriate public education would ensure greater 
compliance with IDEA requirements.230 Additionally, by requiring 
these institutions to find and assess the needs of youth within their 
facilities, officials would have a greater understanding of the needs 
of their inmate population. Thus, appropriate services can be 
provided to meet these needs and enhance the outcomes of these 
individuals.231 
Third, the IDEA provision allowing a student’s IEP or 
placement to be modified in light of certain demonstrated “bona fide 
security or compelling penological interests”232 is acceptable so long 
as adult correctional facilities comply with the provision’s intended 
 
 225. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 226. Mayes, supra note 65, at 201. 
 227. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 228. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 229. See Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 236–38; see also Morris & Thompson, supra 
note 96, at 178 (discussing the difficulty of implementing child find policies and procedures in a 
correctional setting.). 
 230. By requiring adult correctional facilities to identify and assess all potentially eligible 
individuals within their institution, those individuals eligible under the current statutory scheme 
would be identified, and, under the IDEA, they must be provided with special education. 
 231. Davis et al., supra note 12, at iv (“[T]he debate should no longer be about whether 
correctional education is effective or cost-effective but rather on where the gaps in our knowledge 
are and opportunities to move the field forward.”). 
 232. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012). 
2017] SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR INMATES 121 
 
scope.233 The Buckley decision provided a reasonable explanation 
concerning the scope of this provision.234 Adult penal institutions 
must first demonstrate that the compelling safety or penological 
consideration is specific to the individual.235 They must then show 
that such a concern cannot be accommodated through reasonable 
means other than modifying the juvenile’s IEP.236 As such, adult 
penal institutions that follow the law may only modify a juvenile’s 
IEP in specific, limited circumstances. 
Lastly, the IDEA provision limiting the Secretary of Education’s 
withholding power in the event of IDEA violations in adult prisons 
needs to be eliminated.237 The Secretary of Education’s withholding 
power is one of the principal enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
IDEA compliance.238 Without the threat of such a penalty, adult 
correctional institutions can violate the IDEA without losing a 
significant portion of their federal IDEA funding.239 Thus, many of 
these institutions take this minimal forfeiture rather than creating 
special education programs in their institutions.240 With the removal 
of this provision, such institutions would be pressured to ensure 
compliance with the IDEA or risk losing their federal IDEA funding 
altogether. 
In short, the IDEA provisions that allow adult correctional 
facilities to limit the provision of special education to youth 
incarcerated in their institutions need to be modified and their scope 
clarified. Ideally, this would occur on the federal level, with the 
IDEA being amended. However, advocates may have a greater 
chance of success if they first attempt to modify the California 
statutes implementing the IDEA. California has expressed the intent 
to neither enlarge nor abrogate the rights expressed in the federal 
IDEA.241 However, the California Constitution affords greater 
 
 233. See Buckley v. State Corr. Inst.-Pine Grove, 98 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
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 235. Id. at 715–16. 
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122 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:93 
 
educational protection than does the U.S. Constitution.242 Moreover, 
Garcia suggests that California lawmakers may be open to such 
legislation.243 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The provision of special education is a right guaranteed to all 
eligible youth within the United States.244 However, for a substantial, 
but largely unacknowledged population, it is a right they are not 
receiving. Four specific IDEA provisions limit the provision of 
special education in adult correctional facilities for certain 
individuals.245 However, expansive use of these supposedly limited 
exceptions coalesces to create a substantial lack of special education 
programs in adult penal institutions. Legislation amending the IDEA 
is necessary at the federal level in order to ensure that these 
loopholes are closed for all juveniles incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities nationwide. However, until this occurs, 
California should attempt to modify and clarify these provisions so 
that juveniles within the state of California are accorded their 
constitutional rights. As “the denial of appropriate education 
undoubtedly serves to perpetuate a vicious circle of incarceration for 
this at-risk population . . .  the provision of a meaningful educational 
benefit may yet interrupt it.”246 
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